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BIAS V. WRIGHT
California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1
HOLDING:
Oral acceptance of a section 998 offer
is valid if it is undisputed and
written proof of the acceptance follows.
However, oral acceptance will not be valid if it adds or modifies the terms
of the original 998 offer.
PRACTICE POINTER:
Statutory offers to compromise are powerful
tools in resolving litigated
matters. This case reminds us of
the procedural issues associated with the
acceptance of the statutory offer.
Parties making a settlement offer prior
to trial pursuant to section 998 may specify
the method of acceptance
required. Absent a specific method of
acceptance, oral acceptance is valid
as long as it is unequivocal and unqualified.
However, oral acceptance
which adds or modifies a term in the settlement
offer will not be
considered a valid acceptance of a 998
offer and the court will not be
permitted to enter judgment under these
circumstances.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:
On November 28, 2000, Plaintiff Bias served
a section 998 offer on
Defendant Wright, offering to settle Plaintiff's
claim for the sum of
$15,000.00. There was no reference to
costs made in the settlement offer.
In addition, the offer did not require
a specific method in which the
acceptance had to be communicated. The
parties
agreed that the deadline for
acceptance of the offer was January 4,
2001.
On January 4, 2001, counsel for Wright,
Bryson, instructed his secretary to
call Bias' counsel, Sheaks, to accept
the offer. Bryson's secretary did so
and was asked to send a written confirmation
of the acceptance. A notice of
acceptance was sent on Wright's behalf,
stating that Bias' offer was
accepted and that "each party bear their
own respective costs."
On January 5, 2001, Sheaks informed Bryson
that Wright's acceptance was not
valid due to the fact that an additional
term regarding costs had been
added. Subsequently, the notice of acceptance
and the section 998 offer
were filed with the court. However, judgment
was not entered.
On April 24, 2001, Wright moved to enforce
the settlement agreement and
requested that the court enter judgment
pursuant to the terms of the
purported settlement. In support of its
motion, Wright included the
declarations of Bryson and Bryson's secretary
regarding the oral acceptance
of the offer on January 4, 2001. Bias
opposed Wright's motion, stating that
her intention was to recover costs along
with the $15,000.00 settlement and
that the oral communication of January
4, 2001 was an unqualified
acceptance. The trial court entered judgment
in favor of Bias in the sum of
$15,000.00 plus recoverable costs, holding
that Wright's supporting
declarations were proof of acceptance
of Bias' offer. The Court of Appeal
reversed.
DISCUSSION:
Section 998 expressly requires settlement
offers made pursuant to this
section to be in writing. However, section
998 does not have a parallel
provision requiring acceptances to be
in writing. The only requirement is
that proof of acceptance must be filed
with the court. Therefore, parties
making a section 998 offer are free to
specify the method in which
acceptance must be communicated. Section
998 offers and acceptances are
governed by general contract principles.
When no method of communication is
specified, oral acceptance is valid as
long as it is unequivocal and
written proof of the acceptance is subsequently
filed with the court.
However, oral communication which modifies
or adds the terms of the
settlement offer is not considered a valid
acceptance. Instead, this is a
counteroffer.
Under section 998, a court's duty to enter
judgment is merely ministerial.
Therefore, a court may only conduct this
ministerial act when acceptance is
absolute and unequivocal. When a court
is faced with a dispute regarding
terms of a settlement offer, the court
is forced to adjudicate the disputed
facts. Such adjudication is not permitted
under section 998.
In the instant case, Bias' offer did not
specify the manner in which
acceptance was to be communicated. Therefore,
Wright was free to accept the
offer in any manner that comported with
general contract principles.
Wright's purported acceptance of Bias'
offer which added a term regarding
costs was a counteroffer rather than an
acceptance. Faced with this dispute
regarding the terms of the settlement
agreement, the trial court was not
permitted to adjudicate the dispute under
section 998. Therefore, the Court
of Appeal held that the trial court erred
by considering the contradictory
evidence regarding the terms of the settlement
and entering judgment. |